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Abstract
The binomial system is an electoral system unique in the world. It was used to elect the senators and deputies of
Chile during 27 years, from the return of democracy in 1990 until 2017. In this paper we study the real voting power
of the different political parties in the Senate of Chile during the whole binomial period. We not only consider the
different legislative periods, but also any party changes between one period and the next. The real voting power
is measured by considering power indices from cooperative game theory, which are based on the capability of the
political parties to form winning coalitions. With this approach, we can do an analysis that goes beyond the simple
count of parliamentary seats.
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1. Introduction
Today, all Latin American countries have a congress or assembly, which represents the legislative power of their
nation.1 These bodies can be classified as two types: the unicameral, defined by a single Chamber of Deputies
(Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela), sometimes referred to as
“assemblymen” (Ecuador) or “congressmen” (Peru); and the bicameral, defined by a Chamber of Senators and another
of Deputies (Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Haiti, Mexico, Paraguay, and Dominican Republic), which are sometimes also
referred to as “representatives” (Colombia, Uruguay).
In Chile, legislative power lies with the National Congress, a bicameral body with a Senate and a Chamber of
Deputies. Each parliamentary candidate represents a geographic sector of the country. The senators represent sena-
torial constituencies, which normally agree with the country’s regions, and the deputies represent electoral districts,
which are normally a group of neighboring communes. With regards to its structure, the Congress of Chile is no
different most other bicameral bodies. However, its process of electing representatives between 1989 and 2017 distin-
guishes it from the rest of the world’s legislative bodies.
Since return to democracy in 1989, parliamentary elections in Chile have taken place every four years, and as of
this writing, the last one took place in November 2017. Over the last 28 years, these elections have been governed by
the provisions of the current Political Constitution of 1980, established during the period of military dictatorship, and
any subsequent amendments. Throughout this period, parliamentary elections were carried out through an electoral
process known as the binomial system, the only one of its kind in the world. The binomial system assigns two
parliamentary seats to each electoral entity. For example, if two Candidates X and Y of the same political coalition
have double the number of votes than another Candidate Z, then Candidates X and Y assume two seats, to the detriment
of Candidate Z, even though the latter may have received more votes than X or Y when considered independently.
Email addresses: fabian.riquelme@uv.cl (Fabia´n Riquelme), pgonzalez@instagis.com (Pablo Gonza´lez-Cantergiani),
gabriel.godoy@usach.cl (Gabriel Godoy)
1One exception could be Venezuela, where since 2016, the executive power, represented by Nicola´s Maduro, has curbed the power of the
legislative body, represented by the National Assembly of Venezuela.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
07
85
4v
1 
 [e
co
n.G
N]
  1
4 A
ug
 20
18
This system has been very controversial. Its proponents believe that it maintains political stability, while its opponents
point to problems of malapportionment and argue that the system favors bipartisanship, at the expense of political
mobility and the participation of independent candidates [5, 22, 14, 19, 13]. According to [15], at least until 2005,
the political right coalition benefited the most from the binomial system. Therefore, their principal resistance to its
replacement was not losing seats in Congress but rather the desire to maintain the status quo of a bipartisan system,
supported by two broad political coalitions (the “Alianza” of the right, and the “Concertacio´n” of the center-left)
formed by a number of smaller political parties.
In November 2017, Chile faced a major change in the election of its senators and deputies. The binomial system
was replaced by the well-known d’Hondt method, a highest-averages method that allocates seats in proportion to the
votes obtained by each party-list. Moreover, the number of seats in Congress was increased and the distribution of
seats among the country’s districts was changed [20, 4]. This will give rise to important changes in district [1] and
regional [18] representation and voting power. As a result, we can discuss the period of return to democracy, between
1989 and 2017, as a distinctive epoch in the history of the Chilean legislative system.
The main goal of this article is to study the real voting power of Chile’s parties during the 1989-2017 Chilean
legislative epoch. We restrict our analysis to the Senate, due to the considerable effort required to accounting for all
changes in the political system and in politicians holding congressional seats (either because of a change in legislative
period, illness, impeachment, or other extenuating circumstances). By “real voting power” we are referring to not
only the number of senators belonging to each party, but also the power indices of the parties in each period and how
different changes during distinct legislative periods affected the political trends of the Senate of Chile.
Power indices come from cooperative game theory, a multidisciplinary approach developed in the 1940s for the
formal study of cooperation and conflict situations in rational decision-making processes [25]. Power indices are
usually related to the capacity of each voter to form winning coalitions, which are a central structure in the study of
voting systems [17]. Various electoral systems in Europe and North America have been studied using this approach,
with the determination of the real voting power of different politicians involved in each voting system as one of its main
outcomes [23]. Despite this, the voting systems used in Latin America have rarely been studied with power indices.
This study is presented as a crucial contribution to understanding how the Senate of Chile operates, complementing
other approaches like those previously mentioned. These techniques can also be replicated by the study of the voting
systems in other countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the different political parties that
have been represented in the Senate of Chile between 1990 and 2017, as well as their political coalitions and political
tendencies. Then we describe and analyze the changes in the political tendencies of the senators during that period.
Taking into account this information and the different quorums associated with the kinds of law that are voted on, we
define the different voting systems presented in the Senate during the binomial system epoch. These voting systems are
represented as weighted voting systems, where the players are the different political parties and the political coalitions
represented in the Senate. Next we apply power indices on these weighted voting systems, in order to measure the
real voting power of each actor. Finally, we present our analysis, results, and the main conclusions of our work.
2. Political Parties in the Senate of Chile (1990-2017)
The first primary parliamentary elections following the return to democracy were held in December of 1989. The
elected congressmen assumed their position in March of 1990. Since then, Congress was composed of 38 senators
elected democratically, representing 19 senatorial constituencies. Until 2006, there were also between eight and
eleven designated senators serving life terms. Although these senators do not represent any constituencies, they must
be considered in this study because they also contribute to different political tendencies.
Since 1989, only 13 political parties had held representation in the Senate (see Table 1).2 Of them, seven parties
are still in power after elections of 2017, while the other six have only briefly held seats in the Senate. Three of these
six parties (SA, CH1, UCC) have dissolved before 2017, while the other (PRI) has not had representation in Congress
since 2010. If we consider that there are more than 30 political parties currently in Chile, and many other parties
have been created and dissolved between 1989 and 2017, we can conclude that the parties represented in the Senate
2Hereafter, for simplicity, we will refer to the political parties by their abbreviations.
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Table 1: Political parties of Chile with representation in the Senate. The symbol “/” means change of name or replacement by an analogous
body.
Political Coalition Political Party Years in the Senate
Concertacio´n / Nueva Mayorı´a Movimiento Amplio Social (MAS) / Paı´s 2008-2017
(Center-left) Partido Socialista de Chile (PS) 1990-2017
Partido Radical (PR) /
Socialdemocracia Chilena (SDCH) / 1990-2017
Partido Radical Social Demo´crata (PRSD)
Partido Por la Democracia (PPD) 1990-2017
Democracia Cristiana (DC) 1990-2017
Out of pact Democracia Regional Patago´nica (DRP) 2013-2017
(Center-right) Somos Ayse´n (SA) 2014-2016
Amplitud (Amp) 2014-2017
Alianza / Chile Vamos ChilePrimero (CH1) 2007-2010
(Right) Partido Regionalista Independiente (PRI) 2009-2010
Unio´n Demo´crata Independiente (UCC) 1994-2002
Renovacio´n Nacional (RN) 1990-2017
Unio´n Demo´crata Independiente (UDI) 1990-2017
are only a small fraction of the total number of parties in Chile. However, almost all the largest and most traditional
parties of the country have always held representation in the Senate, with the exception of the “Partido Comunista”
(PC) which until 2017 held 6 of 120 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
Political parties such as PC, PS, PRSD and DC are considered traditional parties, since they were formed prior to
the 1973 Chilean coup. The first two political parties were banned during the military dictatorship and only resumed
normal activities after the return of democracy. Around the second half of the 1980s, other parties were founded,
such as PPD, created with the sole purpose of bringing down Augusto Pinochet in the 1988 national plebiscite and
the two most popular right-wings parties, RN and UDI. Other parties, such as the right UCC and the center-right CH1
parties, had a short period of existence. The PRSD party was the result of a union of the PR and SDCH parties in
August of 1994. In the last few years, new political parties have been created as well. These include Amplitud (right),
MAS (left), and others focused on solving the problem of centralism, in particular DRP (center-right) and PRI (first
center-right, and then right). MAS’s only representation in the Senate was their founder, Alejandro Navarro, who later
renounced MAS and created the Paı´s party. For this reason, these two parties are considered together.
During the whole binomial system period, there had been strong bipartisanship in Chile. In fact, most of the
parties in Congress traditionally collaborated in one of the two main political coalitions. The center, center-left and
left coalition was originally called Concertacio´n de Partidos por la Democracia, until 2013 when two political parties
(PC and MAS) joined and changed its name to Nueva Mayorı´a. On the other hand, the center-right and right coalition
is called Chile Vamos, although it has had other names including Alianza, Coalicio´n por el Cambio, and Unio´n por el
Progreso de Chile, among others. The main parties and founders of this coalition are UDI and RN. To facilitate the
naming conventions in this paper, we will refer to these coalitions as “Concertacio´n” and “Alianza”, respectively, the
names most used during the whole period.
Figure 1 shows the political parties since 1990 with representation in the Senate of Chile, sorted by the political
spectrum, from left to right. The figure also includes the independent parties and the parties that did not belong
to a coalition. Note that the independent right parties always belonged to the Alianza. The DC party, although is
considered a right-wing party in many countries, played an important role within the Concertacio´n. The CH1 party
belonged to the Alianza between May 2009 and January 2012, however only had a senator in office for less than one
year. After its dissolution in January 2013, some of its members remained as center-right independents, while another
group founded the Partido Liberal center party without any ties to the main coalitions.
For the last presidential elections of November 2017, the DC party rejected the idea of participating in the Nueva
Mayorı´a primaries, and supported their own candidate Carolina Goic, aside from the candidacy of Alejandro Guillier
(Independent, pro-PRSD). This created a division within the Nueva Mayorı´a coalition, which could result in a major
rift in the future that coincides with the end of the binominal system.
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Figure 1: Political parties with Senate representation from 1990 to 2017, grouped by their political coalition and ordered by their place on the
political spectrum from left to right.
3. Historical Political Tendencies of Senators (1990-2017)
In this section we present an exhaustive analysis about all the changes in political tendencies by senators since the
beginning of the National Congress in 1990 until the end of the binominal system in 2017. The numbers of senators
by party in each period and subperiod are described in Table 2. The term period describes the parliamentary period,
beginning in March and ending in March four years later. Changes in seats at the beginning of each period occur
only from the results of the parliamentary elections of the previous year. We will use subperiods to list all the small
changes that occur in a period, due to any of the following factors:
1. A senator changes his political tendency or renounces his party.
2. A senator leaves his position to assume a ministry position in the government. His seat is replaced by another
politician of the same coalition (but possibly from another party).
3. A senator is removed from his position to be investigated or impeached for legal reasons.
4. A senator dies during his time in office. In that case, the seat may be filled by another politician from the same
party, or the seat will remain available until the next term if there is an upcoming election.
The reasons for each change between one subperiod and another are detailed in Table 3.
3.1. Independent Senators
Table 2 includes senators who do not belong to any political party. A politician can be an independent, with
no affiliation to a party but in a political coalition. In fact, the independent center-left senators have traditionally
represented the Concertacio´n, and those of the right have belonged to the Alianza. Only the center independent
senators are considered out of both pacts. To determine the political tendency of the independent senators, we classify
them by which party list they belonged to when they were elected and the political leaning of those parties.
There are some politicians elected as independents, especially during the first legislative period, but as soon they
assumed office, they joined a political party. In those cases, we consider them as a regular member of a political party.
Thus, senators are only listed as an independent if they maintained their independent affiliations for at least a few
months after they assumed their position.
Additionally, there are a few senators that are not registered with a party, but whose views are entirely aligned
with some party, like in the case of Pedro Araya (Ind. DC) and Alejandro Guillier (Ind. PRSD). Given that the
votes of these politicians are completely aligned with those of a party, we count them as party politicians instead of
independents.
Finally, the designated senators of the Armed Forces of Chile, who held relevant positions during the military
dictatorship, were considered as right independents, while the non-military senators coming from either the Supreme
Court or the Comptroller General of Chile, were considered center independents.
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Table 2: Number of senators in each political party between 1990-2017. Dotted rows separate the different legislative periods. Gray squares
mean that the party did not exist at that time.
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03/90-11/90 0 1 4 4 0 13 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 14 4 47
11/90-04/91 0 4 4 1 0 13 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 14 4 46
04/91-05/93 0 5 4 1 0 12 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 14 4 46
05/93-03/94 0 5 4 1 0 12 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 15 3 46
03/94-03/98 0 5 1 2 0 13 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 12 3 46
03/98-06/98 0 4 2 2 0 15 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 7 9 48
06/98-08/98 0 4 2 2 0 15 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 6 9 48
08/98-03/00 0 4 2 2 0 15 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 6 9 47
03/00-12/00 0 4 2 2 0 16 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 6 9 48
12/00-01/02 0 4 2 2 0 16 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 10 48
01/02-03/02 0 4 2 2 0 16 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 6 10 49
03/02-07/02 0 5 2 3 0 14 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 11 49
07/02-12/02 0 5 2 3 0 14 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 11 48
12/02-03/03 0 5 2 2 1 14 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 11 48
03/03-03/05 0 5 2 2 1 14 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 11 48
03/05-06/05 0 5 3 2 0 14 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 11 48
06/05-03/06 0 5 4 2 0 13 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 11 48
03/06-11/06 0 8 3 3 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 9 38
11/06-05/07 0 8 3 2 0 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 9 38
05/07-11/07 0 8 3 2 0 6 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 8 9 38
11/07-12/07 0 8 3 2 0 6 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 7 9 38
12/07-11/08 0 8 3 2 0 5 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 7 9 38
11/08-01/09 1 7 3 2 0 5 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 7 9 38
01/09-07/09 1 7 3 2 0 5 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 7 9 38
07/09-03/10 1 7 3 1 1 5 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 7 9 38
03/10-02/12 1 5 1 4 0 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 8 38
02/12-12/13 1 5 1 4 0 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 8 38
12/13-01/14 1 5 1 4 0 9 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 8 38
01/14-03/14 1 5 1 4 0 9 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 6 8 38
03/14-10/14 1 6 1 6 0 7 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 8 38
10/14-07/16 1 6 1 6 0 7 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 8 38
07/16-11/16 1 6 1 6 0 7 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 5 8 38
11/16-01/17 1 5 1 6 1 7 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 5 8 38
01/17-04/17 1 5 1 6 1 7 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 5 7 37
07/17-11/17 1 5 1 6 1 7 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 6 7 37
11/17-12/17 1 5 1 6 1 7 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 6 6 36
3.2. Historical Analysis
Table 2 and Table 3 present historical events relevant to Chilean politics. The first two presidential periods after
the return of democracy were the Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) and Eduardo Frei (1994-2000) administrations, both
of whom were DC members. Both presidents counted on a strong DC presence in parliament. Indeed, the DC party,
together with the PRSD party, were the most stable parties with regards to changes in the political tendency of its
members. During the first legislative period (03/1990-03/1994), several PPD candidates were elected to the Senate,
but quickly returned to their original party, the renewed PS. Some right-wing independents did the same and later
officially joined the UDI and RN parties. In contrast, the second legislative period (03/1994-03/1998) was the most
stable period of the whole binomial system era in the Senate because there were no changes in political tendency.
In the beginning, RN led the Alianza in both chambers. However, from 1998 onwards, they began to cede many
seats to UDI, who had begun to gather strength as a result of the nearly successful presidential candidacy of Joaquı´n
Lavı´n (UDI), although Ricardo Lagos (PPD), a candidate backed by PS, ultimately defeated him in 1999. In part
because of Lavı´n’s popularity at the time, UDI positioned itself well in the parliamentary elections of 2002 as the main
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Table 3: Changes in political tendency in the Senate of Chile (1990-2017).
Subperiod Reason for the change in the number of senators of each political party
03/90-11/90 Beginning of the first legislative period
11/90-04/91 The designated senator and commander in chief of the Air Force, Ce´sar Ruiz Danyau (Ind. right) dies. Ricardo Nu´n˜ez,
Jaime Gazmuri and Herna´n Vodanovic (PPD) return to PS
04/91-05/93 Eduardo Frei (DC) resigns to begin his presidential candidacy and is replaced by Marı´a Elena Carrera (PS)
05/93-03/94 Jaime Guzma´n (UDI) dies and is replaced by Miguel Otero (RN)
03/94-03/98 Change of legislative period
03/98-06/98 Change of legislative period
06/98-08/98 Francisco Prat (RN) resigns to his political party and remains Ind. (right)
08/98-03/00 Francisco Javier Erra´zuriz (UCC) is removed from his position for legal conflicts
03/00-12/00 Eduardo Frei (DC), ex-president of the Republic, assumes as senator for life
12/00-01/02 Francisco Prat (Ind. right) leaves his political independence and joins UDI
01/02-03/02 Francisco Javier Erra´zuriz (UCC) regains his parliamentary immunity
03/02-07/02 Change of legislative period
07/02-12/02 Augusto Pinochet (Ind. right) resigned as senator for life, with 86 years old
12/02-03/03 Nelson A´vila (PPD) resigns his political party and remains Ind. (left)
03/03-03/05 Antonio Horvath (Ind. right) leaves his political independence and joins RN
03/05-06/05 Nelson A´vila (Ind. left) leaves his political independence and joins PRSD
06/05-03/06 Jorge Lavandero (DC) is removed from his position for investigation of crimes related to child abuse, being replaced by
Guillermo Va´squez (PRSD)
03/06-11/06 Change of legislative period (end of senators for life)
11/06-05/07 Fernando Flores (PPD) unofficially resigns from his party and remains Ind. (center)
05/07-11/07 Fernando Flores (Ind.center) leaves his political independence and creates CH1 with others
11/07-12/07 Carlos Cantero (RN) resigns to his political party and remains Ind. (right)
12/07-11/08 Adolfo Zaldı´var (DC) is expelled from his party for his opposition to the Concertacio´n and remains Ind. (right)
11/08-01/09 Alejandro Navarro (PS) resigns from his political party and creates MAS
01/09-07/09 Adolfo Zaldı´var leaves his political independence and joins to PRI as presidential candidate
07/09-03/10 Roberto Mun˜oz (PPD) resigns from his political party and remains Ind. (left)
03/10-02/12 Change of legislative period
02/12-12/13 Antonio Horvath leaves RN, behaving like Ind. (right), despite formalizing his resignation in December 2013
12/13-01/14 Carlos Bianchi (Ind. right) and Antonio Horvath (Ind. center) create DRP party
01/14-03/14 Lily Pe´rez (RN) resigns from his political party and joins to Amplitud
03/14-10/14 Change of legislative period
10/14-07/16 Horvath (DRP) resigns to his political party and joins to SA, that in 2017 joins to FREVS
07/16-11/16 Manuel Jose´ Ossando´n (RN) resigns to his political party and remains Ind. (right). In June, Alejandro Navarro resigns
to MAS and creates PAIS
11/16-01/17 Antonio Horvath (SA) resigns from his party and joins to Sentido Futuro’s coalition, remaining as Ind. (Amplitud). Fulvio
Rossi (PS) resigns from his party and remains Ind. (left)
01/17-04/17 Jaime Orpis (UDI) is removed from his position for legal conflicts and resigns from his party
07/17-11/17 Manuel Jose´ Ossando´n come back to RN
11/17-12/17 Iva´n Moreira (UDI) is removed from his position for legal conflicts
party of Alianza. In contrast, during the Lagos administration (2000-2006), DC, a party characterized by its stable
membership, experienced a major crisis when one of their most influential senators, Adolfo Zaldı´var, renounced the
party. Nicknamed the “colorines” due to the red hair of Zaldı´var, other senators and deputies followed suit to create
PRI in 2006, leaving the Concertacio´n and moving closer to the center-right. DC has not been successful thus far in
recovering their political power. Furthermore, during the first term of the socialist president Michelle Bachelet (2006-
2010), which also coincided with the end of appointed senators and those with life terms, PS overpowered the DC
party. This fifth legislative period (03/2006-03/2010) was the least stable for the Senate during the binomial system
era, with a total of eight changes in party membership.
The 2009 parliamentary elections produced a strong increase of the left-wing in the National Congress and were
the first elections since the return of democracy in which PC succeeded in electing deputies. Meanwhile, the next
presidential elections saw the election of the first right-wing president, Sebastia´n Pin˜era (2010-2014) of RN, following
the return of democracy. During the Pin˜era’s administration, both DC and PPD gained senate seats, to the detriment of
PS. Michelle Bachelet’s second term in office (2014-2018) brought a new increase in seats for PS, although less than
that of 2006, at the expense of DC. In contrast, UDI, although strongly affected in the Chamber of Deputies, retained
its seats in the Senate, along with the rest of the right-wing parties. Since 2015, Bachelet received low approval rates
comparable to the Sebastia´n Pin˜era administration. This, together with other factors, such as the creation of a new
political coalition called Frente Amplio that contains new parties independent of the Concertacio´n and Alianza, the
DC crisis, and especially the replacement of the binomial system, produced a notable transformation in the Chilean
political paradigm after the parliamentary elections of November 2017.
With the binomial system, the only period in which the number of Alianza senators surpassed the number from
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Table 4: Types of laws subject to voting in the National Congress and their required motions.
Kind of law Motion to be passed, modified or derogated
Constitutional reform Depending on the Constitution’s Chapter:
2/3 of parliamentarians in exercise
3/5 of parliamentarians in exercise
Constitutional interpretation 3/5 of parliamentarians in exercise
Constitutional organic 4/7 of parliamentarians in exercise
Qualified quorum Absolute majority of parliamentarians in exercise
Common or ordinary Simple majority of parliamentarians in the session
Concertacio´n was during the second legislative period (03/1994-03/1998), in which there were still several designated
senators serving life terms, including Augusto Pinochet. This advantage of the Alianza was also accomplished in the
subperiods between 12/2007 and 03/2010, during the fifth legislative period. In what follows we will see whether
these differences in senators made a difference in the voting power of the different parties and coalitions.
4. Voting Systems in the Senate of Chile
Both chambers of the National Congress can propose, approve, modify and reject bills. In order to approve a law,
there has to first be an agreement in the chamber where the motion was first presented, and then it is must be approved
by the other chamber.
Table 4 shows the distinct types of legislation voted by the National Congress, paired with the quorum required to
ratify, modify, or abolish them. The laws are ordered according to their respective normative power. In addition, there
are treaties and decrees with less normative power since the executive is responsible for approving them [2].
We will now consider the fluctuations in voting power within the Chilean Senate. Rather than focusing on the
specific results of the voting, we look at the potential power of each party. Hence, we let voting systems with
abstentions as future work. This leaves out the study of common laws, which are dependent on the number of session
attendees. Therefore, our study considers constitutional reform laws, constitutional interpretation laws, constitutional
organic laws, and qualified quorum laws. For voting systems with abstentions, the interested writer can see Freixas
and Zwicker [9].
4.1. Voting Systems
A voting system is given by a set of voters and a quorum necessary to carry out a motion, e.g., the passing of a bill.
A winning coalition is a group of voters with enough “yes” votes to achieve the necessary quorum. A losing coalition
is any coalition that is not a winning one, i.e. any group of voters that do not meet the required quorum. A minimal
winning coalition is a winning coalition that would become a losing one if any of the votes changed to a “no.”
Note that all possible coalitions must be either a winning or losing one. This notion of “coalition,” i.e. a group
of voters, should not be confused with a political coalition, i.e. a group of political parties associated with a political
tendency. A “coalition” (winning or losing) could contain voters from many political tendencies. It is also worth
noting that given a winning coalition, if one or more voters change from a “no” to a “yes,” the new coalition would
still be a winning one, and if voters left a losing coalition, it would still be considered a losing one. This property is
known as the monotonicity in voting systems.
In this work, voters are represented by political parties with representation in the Senate. Each voter or political
party has a weight given by the number of sitting senators who belong to the party. This means that the winning
coalitions are a group of political parties, in which the number of senators belonging to those parties reach the required
quorum. Note that the quorum changes according to the type of law being voted on (see Table 4).
The voting systems that use weights for each voter are called weighted voting systems [23], and can be formally
represented by vectors [q; w1,w2, . . . ,wn], where q is the required quorum of the system, depending on the kind of
law, and for each voter or political party i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, wi is the number of senators who belong to the party in that
period or subperiod.
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The voting power of a political party is not directly associated with the number of active senators that belong to the
party. For instance, consider the hypothetical case of three political parties elected, each with 18, 10, and 10 senators,
respectively. Then suppose they want to vote a law with qualified quorum (see Table 4). In this case, to approve the
law 20 votes are required. To calculate the voting power we assume that all the senators of a political party vote in
the same way (something not unusual in the National Congress). Then the system can be represented as a weighted
voting system [20; 18, 10, 10]. Note that, as w1 + w2 = w1 + w3 = 18 + 10 ≥ 20 and w2 + w3 = 10 + 10 ≥ 20, then for
the law to be approved, it is necessary that at least two of the three parties vote in favor. Therefore, every group of at
least two parties is a winning coalition, while any isolated party forms a losing coalition. Since no party can approve
the project unless it has the support of at least one other party, then the three parties share the same voting power, even
though the first party has almost twice of representatives than the other two. The previous exercise shows the need to
use more expressive tools to measure the real voting power. For this we used in Section 4.2 the power indices coming
from cooperative game theory and voting theory [24, 23].
In order to analyze the political parties in Chile between 1990 and 2017, we must consider 144 weighted voting
systems, which are obtained from the 36 periods and subperiods illustrated in Table 2, and considering the four
quorums shown in Table 4, namely b2/3c + 1, b3/5c + 1, b4/7c + 1, and b1/2c + 1. Thus, the games to be analyzed are
the following:
[q, 0, 1, 4, 4, 0, 13, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 14, 4] [q, 0, 8, 3, 2, 0, 6, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, 9]
[q, 0, 4, 4, 1, 0, 13, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 14, 4] [q, 0, 8, 3, 2, 0, 6, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 8, 9]
[q, 0, 5, 4, 1, 0, 12, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 14, 4] [q, 0, 8, 3, 2, 0, 6, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 7, 9]
[q, 0, 5, 4, 1, 0, 12, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 15, 3] [q, 0, 8, 3, 2, 0, 5, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, 7, 9]
[q, 0, 5, 1, 2, 0, 13, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 7, 12, 3] [q, 1, 7, 3, 2, 0, 5, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, 7, 9]
[q, 0, 4, 2, 2, 0, 15, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 6, 7 , 9] [q, 1, 7, 3, 2, 0, 5, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 7, 9]
[q, 0, 4, 2, 2, 0, 15, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 7, 6, 9] [q, 1, 7, 3, 1, 1, 5, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 7, 9]
[q, 0, 4, 2, 2, 0, 15, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 6, 9] [q, 1, 5, 1, 4, 0, 9, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 8, 8]
[q, 0, 4, 2, 2, 0, 16, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 6, 9] [q, 1, 5, 1, 4, 0, 9, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 7, 8]
[q, 0, 4, 2, 2, 0, 16, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 6, 10] [q, 1, 5, 1, 4, 0, 9, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 7, 8]
[q, 0, 4, 2, 2, 0, 16, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 6, 6, 10] [q, 1, 5, 1, 4, 0, 9, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 6, 8]
[q, 0, 5, 2, 3, 0, 14, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 6, 11] [q, 1, 6, 1, 6, 0, 7, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 8]
[q, 0, 5, 2, 3, 0, 14, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 6, 11] [q, 1, 6, 1, 6, 0, 7, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 8]
[q, 0, 5, 2, 2, 1, 14, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 6, 11] [q, 1, 6, 1, 6, 0, 7, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 5, 8]
[q, 0, 5, 2, 2, 1, 14, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 7, 11] [q, 1, 5, 1, 6, 1, 7, 0, 1, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 1, 5, 8]
[q, 0, 5, 3, 2, 0, 14, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 7, 11] [q, 1, 5, 1, 6, 1, 7, 0, 1, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 1, 5, 7]
[q, 0, 5, 4, 2, 0, 13, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 7, 11] [q, 1, 5, 1, 6, 1, 7, 0, 1, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 7]
[q, 0, 8, 3, 3, 0, 6, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, 9] [q, 1, 5, 1, 6, 1, 7, 0, 1, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 6]
where quota q may assume different values, depending on the game. For instance, for a game with 38 senators, the
quotas per each type of law must be 26, 23, 22 and 20. The order of weights refer to the parties as in Figure 1:
MAS/Paı´s, PS, PRSD, PPD, Ind. (center-left), DC, Ind. (center), DRP, Amplitud, CH1, PRI, UCC, Ind. (right), RN,
and UDI.
In addition to the political parties, we also analyze the political coalitions. From the same periods, subperiods,
and quorums, we obtain another 144 weighted voting systems, but only with three players. The first player represents
the Concertacio´n, the second one the independent senators of the center and center-right wing, and the third one the
Alianza. The weights of each game are the sum of the members that belong to each coalition. The weighted voting
games are the following:
[q, 22, 3, 22] [q, 23, 2, 23] [q, 24, 2, 22] [q, 19, 2, 17] [q, 18, 1, 19] [q, 21, 3, 14]
[q, 22, 3, 21] [q, 23, 2, 22] [q, 24, 2, 22] [q, 19, 1, 18] [q, 20, 1, 17] [q, 21, 3, 14]
[q, 22, 3, 21] [q, 24, 2, 22] [q, 24, 2, 22] [q, 19, 1, 18] [q, 20, 1, 17] [q, 21, 3, 14]
[q, 22, 3, 21] [q, 24, 2, 22] [q, 24, 2, 22] [q, 18, 1, 19] [q, 20, 2, 16] [q, 21, 3, 13]
[q, 21, 2, 23] [q, 24, 2, 23] [q, 24, 2, 22] [q, 18, 1, 19] [q, 20, 3, 15] [q, 21, 3, 13]
[q, 23, 2, 23] [q, 24, 2, 23] [q, 20, 1, 17] [q, 18, 1, 19] [q, 21, 3, 14] [q, 21, 3, 12]
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In this case, several consecutive vectors are repeated because some changes in senatorial militancy do not imply a
change in a political coalition.
4.2. Power indices
Given a voting system, power indices are measures that determine the relevance of the voters and their contribution
within the system to form winning coalitions.
In this paper we shall use two classical power indices from the literature, used in the study of voting systems: the
Shapley-Shubik index [21], based on the winning coalitions, and the Deegan-Packel index [7], based on the minimal
winning coalitions. There exist other power indices, such as the Banzhaf index [3], also known as Penrose-Banzhaf
index [16], the Johnston index [12], and the Holler-Packel index [11], also called Public Good Index [10]. However,
for weighted voting systems, Banzhaf and Johnston are ordinally equivalent to Shapley-Shubik [8], while the Holler-
Packel index returns practically the same results than Deegan-Packel [6].
Given a weighted voting game of n voters, let X denote any coalition. Consider a coalition that begins as an empty
coalition and is built by adding different voters sequentially one by one. We say that a voter is a pivot if when it is
added to the losing coalition that is being formed, the coalition becomes winning. Moreover, a voter is critical in a
coalition if that coalition is winning, but removing the voter, it becomes losing. Let us denote as S i the set of coalitions
in which the voter i is critical.
The Shapley-Shubik index (S S ) of a voter i is based on the number of possible voter sequences in which that voter
is a pivot. To normalize this measure, the above value is divided by the total number of sequences in which we can
arrange the voters:
S S (i) =
∑
X∈S i
(n − |X|)!(|X| − 1)!
n!
Let m1, . . . ,m j be the cardinalities of all the minimal winning coalitions that contain i. The Deegan-Packel index
(DP) is given by:
DP(i) =
pi
p1 + p2 + . . . + p j
where pi = 1/mi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ j.
5. Analysis and Results
In this section, we analyze the voting power of the parties and political coalitions in the Senate of Chile during the
seven legislative periods of the binomial system, from 1990 to 2017. 3
Each period and subperiod was analyzed using the four voting quorums described in Table 4, resulting in 144
different weighted voting systems for political parties and another set for political coalitions (see Section 4.1). In
order to compute the voting power of each system we used the Shapley-Shubik and Deegan-Packel indices, giving a
total of 576 calculations.4
The results were correlated using different methods, which allowed us to discover high correlations between
variables that would be nearly impossible to find manually. Because the data set forms a non-parametric space, i.e., the
data do not seem to follow a probability distribution based on a fixed set of parameters, we use the classical Spearman
(ρ) and Kendall (τ) correlation coefficients. The Spearman coefficient assesses how well the relationship between
two variables can be described using a monotonic function. The Kendall coefficient measures the ordinal association
between two measured quantities, i.e., it measures the similarity of the orderings of the data when ranked by each
of the quantities. Both coefficients return values between -1 and 1, where -1 means a perfect inverse correlation, 0
an empty correlation, and 1 a perfect correlation. The computation of the correlation coefficients has an associated
p-value. As usual, we consider the standard 0.05 cutoff as significance level, so that the null hypothesis is rejected
3Supplementary data related to this article can be found at https://figshare.com/articles/Indices_de_Poder_-_Senado_de_
Chile/5450011.
4The code, uploaded under the GNU General Public License v3.0 license, is available at this link: https://github.com/vagnur/
Power-Indices/tree/master.
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Table 5: Correlation levels.
Value Correlation level
-1.0 to -0.8 Very high inverse correlation
-0.8 to -0.6 High inverse correlation
-0.6 to -0.4 Moderate inverse correlation
-0.4 to 0.4 Low and very low correlation
0.4 to 0.6 Moderate correlation
0.6 to 0.8 High correlation
0.8 to 1.0 Very high correlation
when the p-value is lower than 0.05. In what follows, we restrict our attention to those correlation results that are
considered statistically significant, i.e., those with a p-value lower than 0.05.
The correlations ranges can be interpreted as shown in the Table 5. In simple terms, a high correlation between
two variables means that when one variable increases (or decreases) then the other also does. Furthermore, a high
inverse correlation means that when one variable increases (or decreases) the other variable decreases (or increases,
respectively).
5.1. Political Parties
Figures 2 and 3 show the variation of the voting power of each party over time. For the Shapley-Shubik index, the
following conclusions can be made:
• The DC party and Ind. right have a high and very high Kendall correlation. This coincides with the fact that
the expulsion of Adolfo Zaldı´var from the DC party, in December 2007 —which was one of the most important
crises of that party— did not affect significantly the historical voting power of the DC in the Senate.
• The PS and DC parties have a high and very high inverse correlation. This is especially noteworthy because it
means that the two most relevant parties in the Concertacio´n have traditionally disputed their voting power in
the Senate. With the increase of seats of PS, in the fifth legislative period (03/2006-03/2010), the DC was the
most affected party, while the decrease of seats of PS during the following periods resulted in a new increase of
the power of the DC.
• The PS and Ind. right have a high and very high Kendall inverse correlation. This coincides with the high
decrease of right-wing independent senators during the fifth legislative period. However, in this case, this
decrease is not caused by an increase of voting power of the PS party, but by the end of the life senators, in
which there were several right-wing independents.
• DRP and Amplitud parties have a high and very high correlation. This is not surprising, since both are center-
right parties outside the pact, created in the penultimate legislative period. Moreover, they have only held
between 1 and 2 senatorial seats. Therefore, their voting power have been always very similar.
• There is also a high correlation between MAS/PAIS and DRP, as well as between MAS/PAIS and Amplitud.
However, this correlation is restricted to laws with 3/5 and 4/7 quorums. Although MAS/PAIS belongs to the
Concertacio´n, it has had only one representative in the Senate (Alejandro Navarro) and therefore its behavior
is relatively similar to DRP and Amplitud. Another high correlation restricted to the same type of laws can be
found between PS and UDI, but only for Kendall’s correlation coefficient (for Spearman, both parties are not
correlated).
For the same power index, we correlate the voting power obtained for each political party through the time with
all the quorums. Thus we determine that the correlation between the quorums is high and very high for almost all
political parties, except PRSD and UDI. This means that only for these two political parties, the Shapley-Shubik index
returns significantly different values depending on the quorum considered.
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Figure 2: Variation over time of the voting power for the different political parties, considering the different quorums, according to the Shapley-
Shubik index.
A more detailed analysis of the results shows that the DC party leads in voting power during all legislative periods
except the 1st, 5th and 7th ones. The first period was led by RN, leaving the DC in second place, except between
March 1990 and April 1991, wherefore quorums of 1/3 and 1/2 both parties shared the first place. The fifth period was
led entirely by the UDI, which from the second period remained in second place, moving RN to a third place, except
between June 1998 and December 2000, when they reached the fourth place for certain quorums. The UDI resumed
its hegemony at the beginning of the 7th period, but as of January 2017, after the resignation of the Senator Jaime
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Figure 3: Variation over time of the voting power for the different political parties, considering the different quorums, according to the Deegan-
Packel index.
Orpis due to legal conflicts, they had to share his leadership with the DC, yielding second place to the PPD. Before
that, the PPD was in third place during all that period, first together with the PS and RN (until July 2016), then only
with the PS (until November 2016), and finally alone (until January 2017). The PS is another party that has been well
positioned within the Senate. It became the third prevailing party (after the DC and UDI) since April 1991. However,
at the beginning of the second period, it fell to the fourth place, being surpassed by the right-wing independents, and
even falling to the fifth position, in most of the quorums, until December 2000. In that month, with the signature of
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Francisco Prat for the UDI, the PS resumed the fourth indisputable place, after RN, until the end of the 4th period.
Throughout the 5th period, under the first government of Socialist President Michelle Bachelet, the PS rose to second
place, to the detriment of the DC, and remained alone between November 2007 and November 2008, to the detriment
of RN. Finally, since the 6th period, the PS returned to yield its power to the DC, remaining in the third and fourth
place, and being even surpassed by the PPD since November 2016, after the resignation of Senator Fulvio Rossi to
the PS.
For the Deegan-Packel index, the results are quite different. This power index tends to enhance the voting power
of smaller parties. In addition, it increases the variability in the rankings, and decreases the correlation between parties
and quorums. Despite this, a very high correlation between DRP and Amplitud remained. Furthermore, only small
parties behaved in a similar way regardless of the voting quorum. Regarding the DC, UDI, RN, PS, PPD, and PRSD
parties, the results differ a lot depending on the quorum considered.
Due to the above, the hegemony, first of RN, and then of DC and UDI, is not so clear. For certain quorums,
especially the lowest (1/3 and 1/2), the PS appears as the leader during some subperiods of the 1st period, during the
first half of the 5th period, and since October 2014. For the same quorums, RN also reaches the first place, between the
middle of the 4th period and the middle of the following period, at the beginning of the 6th period, and since October
2014. For this power index, it can be observed that changes in smaller parties may generate significant variations in
the voting power of bigger parties. For example, the change in Horvath’s membership from DRP to SA in October
2014, decreased the Deegan-Packel index of the DC in 15% (from 0.184 to 0.156) and of the UDI in 28% (from 0.09
to 0.065).
5.2. Political Coalitions
Just a few changes, of those listed in Table 3, affected the number of seats at political coalitions level. Nine changes
affected the Alianza (3 positives and 6 negatives) and just three changes affected the Concertacio´n (1 positive and 2
negative). Note that only one change affected both political coalitions, which was the expulsion of Adolfo Zaldı´var
from the DC in December 2007, for which he became right-wing independent.
In this case, the correlation results were unreliable due to the small amount of data, i.e., more technically, the
correlation results produced p-values greater than 0.05. However, since the players are only three (Concertacio´n,
Alianza, and Out of pact) the results of the power indices can be analyzed more exhaustively.
The results for the Shapley-Shubik index are illustrated in Figure 4. Note that the voting power of the three
players never completely differs, because in each subperiod at least two of them coincide. In addition, some changes in
subperiods, namely, the death of Senator Ce´sar Ruiz Danyau (right-wing independent), the impeachment of Francisco
Javier Erra´zuriz (UCC), the founding of CH1 party by Fernando Flores, and the impeach of Jaime Orpis (UDI), did
not generate any change in the voting power of the political coalitions.
For constitutional laws (2/3, 3/5, and 4/7 quorums), the Alianza and the Concertacio´n maintained a full balance
in their voting power for more than two decades. For constitutional reforms with 2/3 quorum, this balance remains
unalterable. However, in December 2013, an apparently smaller event, such as the founding of the DRP party by
Antonio Horvath (right-wind independent) and Carlos Bianchi, played in favor of the Concertacio´n, for the case of
constitutional organic laws (quorum 4/7). Since then, the Out of pact parties have emerged, with equal voting power
than the Alianza, but far away from the power reached by the Concertacio´n, which became the dominant political
coalition. The effects of this Horvath move were reproduced identically in the following subperiod, but this time for
constitutional laws with a 3/5 quorum, after Lily Pe´rez left RN to enter Amplitud. Note that both changes came from
the right-wing politics, and involved the emergence of small parties.
The case of qualified quorum laws (quorum 1/2) is the most complex, due to the more significant presence of
the Out of pact. In this case, throughout the first period, started in March 1990, the three players have the same
voting power. But in the second period in March 1994, the balance is broken, because the Alianza, with only two
seats more than the Concertacio´n, achieves more voting power than the Concertacio´n and Out of pact together. In
the March 1998 period the balance returns, but it is broken again by the entry of the ex-president Eduardo Frei (DC)
as life senator. Note that this is the first period where voting power became in favor of the Concertacio´n. This
advantage continues until January 2002, when Erra´zuriz (UCC) regains its parliamentary jurisdiction. The balance
is again broken in favor of the Concertacio´n in July 2002, when Augusto Pinochet (right ind.) leaves his position
of life senator. This new advantage of the Concertacio´n continues until December 2007, and reaches its peak at the
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Figure 4: Variation in the voting power of the political coalitions, for the different quorums, according to the Shapley-Shubik index.
beginning of the fifth legislative period, in March 2006, when it achieved for the first time, during eight months, the
absolute hegemony, which is lost with the retirement of Fernando Flores (PPD) and its approach to the independent
center. In December 2007, after five years of leadership of the Concertacio´n, the expulsion of Zaldı´var from the DC
and his switch to the Alianza reverse the roles, leaving the Alianza with more voting power than that of Concertacio´n
and Out of pact combined. This is only reversed with the following parliamentary elections, in March 2010. Since
then, the Concertacio´n has regained full voting power in the Senate.
Analyzing the presidential periods we can observe that for the constitutional laws, all the presidencies have had a
balance of voting power between both political coalitions. There are two recent exceptions. The first exception was
the case of Sebastia´n Pin˜era (2010-2014), who during his last months of government had to deal with the leadership of
the opposition, the Concertacio´n, for the laws with quorum 3/5 and 4/7. The second exception is the case of Michelle
Bachelet (2014-2018), who has the leadership of the Concertacio´n, the coalition to which she belongs, for the same
quorum laws.
The case for the quorum laws (quorum 1/2) is more complex. The former president Patricio Aylwin (DC, 1990-
1994) ruled with a full balance of power between the three players. By contrast, Eduardo Frei (DC, 1993-2000) had
to deal during his first four years of government with a disadvantage of his political coalition, that only returned to
the balance with the beginning of the next legislative period (March 1998). Ricardo Lagos (PPD, 2000-2006) was the
first president that had for quorum laws a greater voting power of his political coalition, except for the brief period
of balance between January and July 2002, when Erra´zuriz returned from his parliamentary impeachment. Bachelet’s
first government (PS, 2006-2010) began with full leadership of her political coalition, which remained a majority until
December 2007. That month, Zaldı´var’s expulsion from the DC and his approach to the Alianza changed the situation,
giving the leadership to the Alianza for the rest of her government. Sebastia´n Pin˜era’s administration (2010-2014) has
been by far the most affected by this type of law because throughout his presidency, the Concertacio´n had an absolute
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Figure 5: Variation in the voting power of the political coalitions, for the different quorums, according to the Deegan-Packel index.
voting power hegemony, which was maintained during Bachelet’s second term (2014-2018).
Figure 5 shows that the Deegan-Packel has a similar behavior than Shapley-Shubik index, except for a few excep-
tions. Note that in the constitutional organic laws, the change does not occur in December 2013 (with the founding
of Horvath’s DRP party), but happens instead in the next month, which found Lily Pe´rez leaving RN for Amplitud.
Note also that in all cases where Out of pact has some voting power, and one of the political coalitions holds the most
power, then the leader’s voting power is equal to the sum of the voting power of the other players. In this way, we
observe again that the Deegan-Packel index brings the power of the players closer together. The latter allows that,
except in those cases in which Concertacio´n completely dominates the scene, minority players could work together to
prevent the hegemony of the leader.
6. Conclusions
The binomial system is an electoral system unique in the world, used to elect the senators and deputies of the
National Congress of Chile during 27 years, from the return of democracy in 1990 until 2017. In this article, we
study the voting power of the different political parties and political coalitions in the Senate of Chile during the
whole binomial period. We do not just consider the different legislative periods, but also the changes in the seats
existing between one period and the next one. This provides a very detailed list of all relevant events that affected the
parliamentarians in the last 27 years, resulting in 36 subperiods and more than 150 weighted voting games analyzed.
Using power indices coming from cooperative game theory we measured and analyzed the real voting power of
each player. With this approach, we can do an analysis that goes beyond the simple count of parliamentary seats. This
methodology allows us to find which parties lead the voting power in each subperiod and others remarkable findings,
such as the case of DC party that led during all legislative periods except the 1st, 5th and 7th ones, according to the
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Shapley Shubik index. Using the Deegan-Packel index, we show how some smaller parties had noticeable power in
the Senate. In addition, we found positives correlations like the one with DRP, Amplitud and MAS/PAIS; and inverse
correlations like PS with the DC and Ind. right parties.
For the political coalitions, the analysis was more simple due to the inability to calculate correlations and also
that just a few changes affected the number of seats in a coalition level. Besides that, some remarkable findings were
made, like the subperiods where the Out of pact do not have any voting power, the large subperiods where the Alianza
and Concertacio´n have the same voting power (the totality of the 2/3 quorum and the majority of 3/5 quorum), and
how the Concertacio´n has a full voting power in the last nine periods for the 1/2 quorum laws. Furthermore, using the
coalition’s analysis, we could show which presidents had the Congress in his favor, and which ones, like the case of
Sebastian Pin˜era, had a strong opposition.
As a future work, we propose to compare the theoretical result of power indices with the actual results of the
voting processes in the Senate. As a results, we could evaluate which parties, coalitions, or presidents took advantage
according to their voting power. We also encourage others researchers to generate new and original analysis using
the information with the relevant events that affect the numbers of seats in the Senate. Finally, it remains open the
analysis of the Chamber of Deputies, as well as to use power indices variations that allow abstentions [9].
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